Political Regime Change and State Performance

Debojyoti Mazumder, Rajit Biswas

Abstract


The present model analyses how the state would provide services when the change of power depends upon the performance of the state. Agents can evaluate state performance based either only on the receipt of government services, or both on the benefit from government services and taxes imposed. With a credible threat of power change, if the valuation of the government services is low, along with a low fiscal capacity, then it is less probable that this service would be provided. Furthermore, such an allocation is compared with a situation, when there exists a threat of active opposition. Interestingly, that threat does not change the optimum provisioning of government services (as compared to the previous situation) in the equilibrium.


Keywords


state capacity, regime change, conflict, taxes, public good

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5202/rei.v8i1.196

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